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The 20 th Human Development Report has introduced a new version of its famous Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI aggregates country-level attainments in life expectancy, schooling and income per capita. Each year's rankings by the HDI are keenly watched in both rich and poor countries. The main change in the 2010 HDI is that it relaxes its past assumption of perfect substitutability between its three components. However, most users will probably not realize that the new HDI has also greatly reduced its implicit weight on longevity in poor countries, relative to rich ones. A poor country experiencing falling life expectancy due to (say) This paper-a product of the office of the Director, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to assess whether prevailing development indices are providing a reliable guide to assessing country performance and guiding policy making. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mravallion@worldbank.org. a collapse in its health-care system could still see its HDI improve with even a small rate of economic growth. By contrast, the new HDI's valuations of the gains from extra schooling seem unreasonably high-many times greater than the economic returns to schooling. These troubling tradeoffs could have been largely avoided using a different aggregation function for the HDI, while still allowing imperfect substitution. While some difficult value judgments are faced in constructing and assessing the HDI, making its assumed tradeoffs more explicit would be a welcome step.
Introduction
The Human Development Index (HDI) aims to provide a broader characterization of "development" than is possible by focusing on national income alone. For this purpose, the HDI aggregates country-level attainments in life expectancy and education, as well as income. The index has been published since 1990 in the UNDP's Human Development Reports (HDRs).
Each year's scores and rankings by the HDI are keenly watched in both rich and poor countries. The countries that do well on the index are congratulated by each new HDR.
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Politicians and the media often take note. The HDI aims not only to monitor human development, but to encourage countries to take actions that promote it. The latest (2010) HDR claims that the HDI and its various descendants "…yield many novel results-and insights-that can guide development policy debates and designs" (UNDP, 2010, p.8) . UNDP (undated) documents numerous examples of the policy influence of the HDRs, including the HDI.
As in any composite index, users should know what weights are attached to the HDI's dimensions, to properly judge if it has got the balance right. 3 The weight in any given dimension can be defined as the index's first partial derivative ("slope") with respect to that dimension.
Since the units of the index are arbitrary (the HDI is normalized to lie in the 0, 1 interval) what really matters is the relative weights of its component dimensions. In other words, we need to know the assumed tradeoffs, as given by the HDI's marginal rate of substitution (MRS), i.e., how much of one desired component of the HDI must be given up for an extra unit of another component, keeping the overall index constant. If a policy or economic change entails that one of the positively-valued dimensions increases at the expense of another dimension, then it is the MRS that tells us whether human development is deemed to have risen or fallen.
In answer to the question: "Which countries have been most successful in furthering the human development of their people?" (UNDP, 2010, p.41) the HDR looks at HDI indices over 1970-2010 for 135 countries and identifies the "top 10 movers," defined by the rate of increase in their HDI relative to its 1970 value; the countries are Oman, China, Nepal, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Lao PDR, Tunisia, South Korea, Algeria and Morocco. At the other extreme, the report identifies three countries for which the 2008 HDI is lower than its 1970 value: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 3 On the importance of knowing the weights built into a composite index of development see Ravallion (2010a) , which also discusses a number of other issues not touched on here, including the robustness of country rankings and whether aggregation of the core dimensions is useful for policy.
While the HDI has clearly aimed to influence policy makers, and appears to have had some success, the interest in identifying its tradeoffs does not rest on a view that the HDI is the maximand of some policy calculus. The interest stems instead from the need to understand the properties of the index. We can all agree that GDP is an incomplete metric of development. 4 The real issue is how we form a better composite index, should we feel the need for one. 5 What tradeoffs does the index attach to the various components? Only if we accept those tradeoffs can we be confident that the composite index is adequately measuring what it claims to measure.
In common with other "mashup indices" (Ravallion, 2010a) , the HDI's tradeoffs are not constrained by theory, though economic theory can offer some insights into how one might form a composite index of human development. 6 The authors of the HDR set themselves free to pick the HDI's variables and weights. From 1990 to 2009 the HDI gave equal (linear) weights to three functions of its core dimensions for health, education and income.
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While the choice of variables and their weights can certainly be questioned, the HDI has at least appeared to be transparent and simple. That appearance is not quite so evident on closer inspection. Indeed, the HDI has never made explicit its tradeoffs across the core dimensions; users are only told the weights on its three derived functions of those core dimensions, even though the deeper tradeoffs between the core dimensions are clearly more salient. Since income is one of those core dimensions, the tradeoffs can also be monetized, which makes them easier to understand, and to assess whether they are appropriate by comparison with other research findings, including on the economic returns to better health and education. The claims regularly made by the HDR's that "development" is typically defined solely in terms of GDP have surely been exaggerated, as Srinivasan (1994) argued in an early critique of the HDI.
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Saying that there is more than one relevant indicator of development does not in itself imply that we need to force them into one dimension; see Ravallion (2010a) on this point.
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In the context of aggregating mean income and life expectancy, Dowrick et al. (2003) show how revealed preference theory can guide the methodological choices. Also see the more structural economic models in Becker et al. (2005) and Jones and Klenow (2010) , and the latent-variable statistical model used by Høyland et al. (2010) to set the weights for a version of the HDI. The income variable has been somewhat controversial, with some observers arguing against its inclusion in the HDI; on the case for including income, see Anand and Sen (2000) . 8 Advocates of making human development the overarching development goal often reject monetary valuations. However the fact of using money per se as the metric of value cannot be objectionable; rather the issue is how we assess "value." For further discussion and references to the literature on money metrics of social welfare see Ravallion (2010a) . This paper examines the tradeoffs embodied in the latest version of the HDI, as presented in UNDP (2010).
9 After summarizing how the index has changed, the paper turns to its valuations of longevity and schooling. The paper questions whether the HDI's implicit valuations are sending the right signals to governments trying to monitor and promote human development. Next the paper shows that the troubling tradeoffs found in the 2010 HDI could have been avoided to a large extent using an alternative aggregation function from the literature-indeed, a more general form of the old HDI, as proposed by Chakravarty (2003) . A final section concludes.
The Human Development Index
The three core dimensions of the HDI are life expectancy (LE), schooling (S) and income (Y). The changes introduced in the 20 th Human Development Report (UNDP, 2010 ) concern the precise measures used for these core dimensions, and how they are aggregated to form the composite index. Life expectancy is the only core dimension that is unchanged in the 2010 HDI.
Gross national income (GNI) has replaced GDP, both still at purchasing power parity (PPP) and logged. The two variables used to measure the third component, education, have changed.
Literacy and the gross enrolment rate (as used in the old HDI) have been replaced by mean years of schooling (MS) and the expected years of schooling (ES), given by the years of schooling that a child can expect to receive given current enrolment rates.
As in the past, the three core dimensions of the HDI are first put on a common (0, 1) scale. The rescaled indicators are:
where the "max" and "min" denote the assumed bounds (in obvious notation). (Note also that S is itself a composite index of MS and ES, which I return to.) 9 In addition to its new HDI, UNDP (2010) introduced a new "multidimensional poverty measure," which raises a number of distinct issues, as discussed in Ravallion (2010a) .
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The bounds used in rescaling all three variables to common units have also been modified. It used to be assumed that life expectancy is bounded below by 25 years, and above by Note that equation (3) embodies two distinct sources of nonlinearity in the income effect (unlike the one source in (2), namely through the log transformation). In there is both the log transformation of income built into I Y and the power transformation in (3). On twice differentiating with respect to Y one finds that the 2010 HDI is still strictly concave in income. However, the combined effect of these two sources of nonlinearity is to impart a large positive income effect on the HDI's valuations of longevity and schooling, as we will see later.
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Why did the 2010 HDR switch from equation (2) to (3)? The report offers the following explanation:
10 "Poor performance in any dimension is now directly reflected in the HDI, and there is no longer perfect substitutability across dimensions. This method captures how well rounded a country's performance is across the three dimensions. As a basis for comparisons of achievement, this method is also more respectful of the intrinsic differences in the dimensions than a simple average is. It recognizes that health, education and income are all important, but also that it is hard to compare these different dimensions of well-being and that we should not let changes in any of them go unnoticed." (UNDP, 2010, p.15) These reasons are not as compelling as they may seem at first glance. It is true that the old HDI assumed that the scaled indices ( , and ) were perfect substitutes (constant MRS), but this was not true of the core dimensions. Since income enters on a log scale (and is only then rescaled to the 0, 1 interval), income and life expectancy (or income and schooling) were not in fact perfect substitutes even in the old HDI. And relaxing perfect substitutability between , and does not imply that one should switch to the form in (3); one can do so by using instead the generalized (old) HDI proposed by Chakravarty (2003) . (I will return to Chakravarty's index in section V.) The other arguments made by the 2010 HDR for switching to the geometric mean are also less than fully compelling. It is not evident in what sense using the geometric mean makes poor performance more "directly" reflected in the HDI, or more "well rounded," or "more respectful of the intrinsic differences in the dimensions," or that using this aggregation formula means that we do "not let changes in any dimension) go unnoticed." Indeed, A number of commentators in the literature have advocated a multiplicative form for the HDI, such as (3), including Desai (1991) , soon after the HDI first appeared, and Sagar and Najam (1998) (although the 2010 HDR does not refer to these antecedents in the literature). multiplicative form. Using the arithmetic mean instead (with other data unchanged), Zimbabwe still has a low HDI, but it ranks higher than six countries. (And Zimbabwe does even better using the alternative HDI discussed in Section V.)
The rest of this paper examines the country-specific tradeoffs implied by the 2010 HDI, and how they have changed. On a priori grounds it is unclear what effect relaxing perfect substitutability between the scaled indicators ( , and ) would have on the tradeoffs in the core dimensions. Whether the MRS increases or decreases will depend on the data. This is illustrated in Figure 2 , which plots the contours (holding the HDI constant) between log income per capita and life expectancy for both the arithmetic mean (the straight line contour) and the geometric mean (the convex one). As usual, the MRS is the absolute value of the slope of the contour. For convenience, countries A and B are taken to have the same HDI either way. 11 For country A, the switch implies a higher MRS, while for B the MRS is lower. The fact that we are more interested in the MRS with the core dimension of income ("unlogged") adds further theoretical ambiguity to the effect of this change in the HDI.
While the focus here is on the HDI's implicit tradeoffs, knowing those tradeoffs is clearly not sufficient for deciding whether policies that promote health care or education will promote human development. Even leaving aside the issue of whether the HDI is an adequate representation of that goal, we would also need to know the costs, assuming that it is national income net of those costs that is valued for human development. 12 And those costs will vary across countries. The costs of lengthening life or raising school attainments are also likely to be higher in richer countries, given that health and education services are labor intensive, and (hence) will tend to be more expensive in rich countries where wages are higher.
I will note some comparisons with the costs of increasing longevity, drawing on the literature. However, this paper's focus on the valuations built into the HDI is primarily intended
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In other words, the scaled values of log income and life expectance are swapped between A and B. More generally, depending on the data and assumed bounds, the switch to the geometric mean may alter the HDI ranking of A and B.
to inform public understanding of the HDI, rather than to inform discussions of what policies might increase human development.
In examining the implications of the changes to the HDI for its implicit valuations, I
focus first on the HDI's valuation of longevity, after which I turn to its valuation of schooling.
The HDI's troubling valuations of longevity
While the weights attached to the HDI's scaled indices ( , and ) are explicit, those on the core dimensions (LE, S and Y) are not, and arguably it is these weights that we care about in understanding the properties of the HDI. 13 The HDRs have never discussed explicitly the valuations on its core dimensions, and they can be questioned. Ravallion (1997) pointed out the seemingly low monetary value implicitly attached to longevity in poor countries by past HDIs (using an earlier functional form). As we will see, it turns out that the changes introduced in the 2010 HDR have lowered the HDI's valuation of longevity in poor countries even further.
The HDI's marginal weights can be readily derived by differentiating equation (2) or (3) with respect to each variable. The effect on these weights of switching to the new formula for the HDI is theoretically ambiguous, and will vary across countries according to:
For longevity we find that for 164 of the 169 countries. So the new HDI has lowered the weight on longevity for all but five countries (using the new bounds). For the old HDI the marginal value on longevity was a constant, 3 0.0054. ( capita (on a log scale to avoid bunching up at low incomes). It can be seen that a strong positive income gradient has been introduced, with markedly lower weights for poorer countries (in terms of GNI per capita). This pattern is not confined to income; the weight on longevity is also positively correlated with the (new) HDI (r=0.697; which is significant at 0.001level using a robust standard error) and life expectancy (r=0.347-also significant at 0.001 level).
14 By contrast to longevity, the new formula for the HDI increased the weight on income for the bulk of the countries. In particular, one finds that for 148 countries.
The HDI implicitly puts a monetary valuation on an extra year of life, where that valuation is defined by the tradeoff between longevity and income, i.e., the extra income needed to compensate for a year less of life expectancy, keeping the HDI constant. This is given by the ratio of the HDI's marginal weight on longevity to its weight on income. Denote this tradeoff by
VLE. We have (in obvious notation):
6.1
6.2
It can be seen that is directly proportional to , given the bounds.
The direction of the effect on VLE of switching from the old to the new formula for the HDI is theoretically ambiguous, and depends on both the data and the bounds used for rescaling the variables. Since the weight on longevity has fallen for the bulk of countries, while it has risen for income, we can also expect lower monetary valuations of longevity. More precisely, it is plain from equations (6.1) Given the function form, the new HDI is strictly concave in its core dimensions, but this only tells us that the weight on x declines with x, holding the other two components constant. In these data-based comparisons, the other variables are not constant, and so their interaction effects come into play.
2008. Figure 4 plots the valuations against national income. (I return to explain the "marginal cost" series in Figure 4 .) The HDI's value of longevity in the poorest country, Zimbabwe, is a remarkably low $0.51 per year, representing less than 0.3% of that country's (very low) mean income in 2008.
Thus the 2010 HDI implies that if Zimbabwe takes a policy action that increases national income by a mere $0.52 or more per person per year at the cost of reducing average life expectancy by one year, then the country will have promoted its "human development."
Granted Zimbabwe has an unusually low GNI. The next lowest valuation of longevity is for Liberia, for which the HDI attaches a value of $5.51 per year to an extra year of life expectancy; this is 10 times Zimbabwe's valuation, though it is still only 1.7% of Liberia's annual income. The value tends to rise with income and reaches about $9,000 per year in the richest countries (Figure 4 ). The highest valuation of longevity is 17,000 times higher than the lowest. Even dropping Zimbabwe's (exceptionally low) valuation, the differential is 1,600.
The least-squares elasticity (the ordinary regression coefficient of on ) is
1.208 (with a robust standard error of 0.033; n=169). This is significantly greater than unity, implying that the HDI's valuation of longevity as a proportion of mean income tends to rise with mean income. The elasticity is also higher than most past estimates of the income elasticity of market-based estimates of the value of statistical life.
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The fact that the valuation of longevity as a proportion of mean income tends to rise with mean income is confirmed by Figure 5 . (The highest value as a proportion of GNI turns out to be almost 16%, in Equatorial Guinea, though this is clearly an outlier.) By contrast, the old HDI had an income elasticity of unity, and (when evaluated with the HDI's new bounds) is almost exactly 10% of each country's annual income.
The changes to the HDI have devalued longevity, especially in poor countries. Given the construction of the index, / is directly proportional to / (equations 6.1 and 6.2); the constant turns out to be 10.014. So by dividing the vertical axis of Figure 5 by 10 (noting that the axis is in percent), we can also read it as a graph for / . (Selected   15 A review of the evidence by Viscussi and Aldy (2003) concludes that the income elasticity is in the range 0.5-0.6. points for / are indicated on the vertical axis in parentheses.) There was a roughly 25% downward revision on average (mean / 0.748). If one focuses on the poorest half of countries (GNI per capita below the median) then the average downward revision was close to 40% (mean / 0.620 ; n=84); for the poorest quarter, the valuation of longevity has been almost halved ((mean / 0.545; n=42)). Probably most importantly, updating solely for inflation in the US misses the structural changes in growing developing economies, which entail changes in their relative prices; in particular, we can expect that the cost of attaining higher longevity may have risen more in rapidly growing economies such as China than these estimates indicate. This is suggested by comparisons of PPP estimates across different rounds of the International Comparison Program; see Ravallion (2010b) . sample) than the lowest (Madagascar). This is far less than my calculations of the differential in the valuation of longevity implicit in the HDI. The DDQ estimates are only roughly similar to the HDI's valuations for the poorest countries, but the HDI's valuations greatly exceed marginal costs among most countries, and the gap is very large for the richest countries.
Across individuals, one expects the value attached to extra longevity to rise with income.
Even if (instantaneous) utility depends only on consumption, a high income allows more to be consumed in the extra years of life, giving higher expected utility.
17 Similarly, one would expect people in rich countries to be willing to pay more for extra longevity, and they clearly do.
However, such observations do not justify building an income gradient (let alone a steep gradient) into the valuation of longevity. The HDI is clearly intended to embody social values, which need not accord with private ones.
With reference to the private valuations of "statistical life"-such as derived from contingent valuation questions in surveys or wage premia paid for risky jobs-Ackerman and Heinzerling (2001, p.18) note a similar concern:
"Calculation of the link between average income and the value of a statistical life could, if applied indiscriminately, lead to the unacceptable implication that rich people, or residents of rich nations, are worth more than the poor."
While the HDI is not deriving its valuations of longevity from such sources, the fact that it puts a higher value to an extra year of life for people in rich countries than poor ones is arguably no less of an example of the "unacceptable implication" that Ackerman and Heinzerling refer to.
This troubling tradeoff in the 2010 HDI will clearly influence its rankings of performance in human development. However, a more worrying concern arises if the index influences (domestic and international) policy making. The HDI's embedded tradeoffs imply that, in the interests of promoting human development-or at least improving its HDI-the government of a poor country should not be willing to pay more than a very small sum (in $'s and as a percent of national income) for an extra year of expected lifespan for its citizens, while the government of a rich country would be encouraged to spend vastly more for the same gain in longevity-17,000 times more if one compares my calculation of for the richest country with the poorest.
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Suppose instead that (i) utility is strictly increasing in both life expectancy and income; (ii) the marginal utility of higher life expectancy does not fall with higher income, and that (iii) there is declining marginal utility of income. Then the MRS will be an increasing function of income.
Serious objections would naturally be raised to any proposal for public action within one country that rested on assigning a lower value to life to poor citizens than to rich ones, let alone a relative value that is such a tiny fraction. The same objections arise in a global context.
One is led to question whether these valuations are consistent with promoting "human development." Yet, the 20 HDRs have largely avoided making explicit this potentially troubling tradeoff, although the basic problem was noted in early commentaries (Ravallion, 1997) .
The HDI's valuations of schooling
The fact that the HDI's education variables have changed is not of obvious concern in this context, so I will only use the new schooling variables in the 2010 HDI. Applying equation (4), I find that that the new HDI's aggregation method has put a higher weight on schooling for 119 of the 169 countries (i.e., all those with ).
The ratio of the old and new weights in (4) does not depend on precisely how a gain in schooling is allocated between mean actual years of schooling and mean expected years There is some support for this assumption in the data; the regression coefficient of expected schooling on mean current schooling is 0.88, which is close to unity, although it is still significantly less than unity (t=2.54, based on a robust standard error; n=169). =$33 per year, or 11% of annual income. At the other extreme, rises to $53,000 per year in the country with the second highest GNI per person, representing 67% of that country's GNI. The valuation of schooling has increased in 94 countries, though the increase is more marked amongst high-income countries. Given the cross-country differences in schooling, the valuation of schooling as a proportion of GNI does not rise with GNI above some point; Figure 8 plots / against GNI. (The highest / is for Burkina Faso, but this is an outlier.)
While the HDI's implicit valuations of longevity seem low, it's valuations on schooling seem high. In constructing a composite index such as the HDI, there is a (rather poorlyunderstood) issue about what dimensions are intrinsically, versus instrumentally, important. We can all agree that a longer life is valued intrinsically, independently of income. However, it is not quite so clear that education has such a large intrinsic value (as assumed by the HDI), rather than being (very) important instrumentally to income and (hence) welfare.
In defense of the HDI, one might argue that the benefits of extra schooling are not fully reflected in current incomes; better educated parents pass advantages onto their children, leading to higher future incomes. (Possibly the new HDI's introduction of the variable for expected schooling is trying to capture this effect.) But it is a moot point just how much extra one would allow for such an effect, on top of the economic return to schooling. The HDI is presumably measuring a country's current human development not its future value.
If we compare the HDI's valuations on schooling with the returns implied by earnings regressions, the HDI's valuations are clearly very much higher. The regression coefficient of log earnings on years of schooling is typically around 0.1; see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) .
So it seems that the HDI is putting a much larger value on the returns to schooling than is reflected in current earnings. Indeed, the HDI's valuation in developing countries appears to be roughly four times the labor market returns to schooling.
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Finally, Figure 9 compares the new HDI's valuations for longevity and schooling. What is most striking is how much higher the HDI's implicit valuation of schooling is than its
For high-income countries, the ratios of the valuation of extra schooling to mean income in Figure 6 are roughly seven times the coefficients on years of schooling reported by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002, 
5.
Could the HDI's troubling tradeoffs have been avoided?
Instead of using the geometric mean, suppose that the HDR's team had generalized its old additive HDI in the natural form proposed by Chakravarty (2003) , giving the "generalized (old) HDI:"
where f is some smooth, twice-differentiable, concave function mapping from the [0,1] to [0, 1] with f(0)=0 and f(1)=1. Chakravarty (2003) shows that the form in (8) Chakravarty (2003) actually proves a more powerful result: an even more general index will satisfy these three axioms if and only if it takes the form of equation (8). 21 Note that this still allows diminishing marginal returns to income; the new HDI's functional form-in which income is logged within the scaled index, and then the index is raised to the power of 1/3-is arguably an "overkill" since one only needs one source of nonlinearity.
With these modifications, we can avoid the troubling property of the 2010 HDI in Figure   3 , whereby the marginal effect on the index of an extra year of life rises with national income per capita (and the HDI itself). Indeed, we now have the reverse slope, with higher weight on longevity in poorer countries; Figure 10 gives the weights on longevity implied by , for r=0.5 and 0.25. Instead of a higher weight on longevity in richer countries, we now find that the weight rises from 0.0026 in one of the richest countries to 0.0042 in the poorest (r=0.5). The pattern is similar using r=0.25, though the negative gradient is less steep.
The implied tradeoffs with income are given by:
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We still find higher monetary valuations on longevity and schooling in richer countries, but gives higher valuations for poor countries than and the troubling income gradient is much attenuated. Figure 11 compares the valuations on longevity in with those implied by for r=0.5 and 0.25; Figure 7 gives the corresponding valuations for schooling (only for r=0.5 to avoid cluttering up the graph; the series for r=0.25 is similar to the pattern in Figure 11 ). In both cases, the implied valuations rise with income per capita, but much less steeply than implied by the 2010 HDI. The lower value of reduces the income gradient.
The Chakravarty index also puts higher valuations on schooling than longevity, similarly to the 2010 HDI. This property appears to be hard to avoid given the differences in distributions noted in Figure 1 and the assumed bounds. Of course, increasing the weight on relative to that on will narrow the gap in the valuations of schooling and longevity. However, I found that on even doubling the weight on the life expectancy component (equally weighting the other two components) the valuation on schooling still exceeded that on longevity. to be the 12 th lowest-reflecting the fact that the additivity property of the Chakravarty index puts a higher premium on Zimbabwe's schooling attainment. Using r=0.25, the upward revision to Zimbabwe's index is even more dramatic, with . =0.583. The largest decrease is that for New Zealand, for which the index falls by 0.094 in switching to . , and the ranking falls from third place to 18 th . The differences are small at high HDIs using r=0.25 (Figure 12 ).
Conclusions
The Human Development Index was introduced in 1990 as an alternative to using national income per capita as the metric of development success. Until 2010 the index was an equally-weighted mean of scaled attainments in three dimensions: life expectancy, education and income. The simplicity of the HDI gave it a transparency that was clearly appealing to many users, although the HDI was never quite as simple as one might think at first glance, given the transformations embedded in its components. Over 20 years, the Human Development Reports (and numerous offshoot reports at national level) have applauded those countries that do well in the HDI, and offered advice to others on how they might do better in the HDI stakes.
A new version of the index was introduced in the 2010 edition of the HDR. The main change was to switch from the original additive aggregation function (the arithmetic mean of the three components) to a multiplicative function (their geometric mean). The main reason given for this change was to allow for imperfect substitutability between the HDI's three components.
However, good intentions alone do not make for good measurement. The 2010 HDI is both more complicated and more problematic in its tradeoffs across core dimensions. Longevity in poor countries has been substantially devalued, though it seems unlikely that this was intended. The HDI's valuation of longevity in the poorest country is now a mere 0.006% of its value in the richest country-a far greater difference than in their average incomes (for which the poorest country has 0.2% of the national income per capita of the richest). A poor country experiencing falling life expectancy due to (say) a collapse in its already weak health-care system could still see its HDI improve with even a small rate of economic growth. By contrast, the valuations of extra schooling have risen for most countries and they seem high-some four times higher than the valuations typically placed by the labor market on extra schooling.
There are some contentious value judgments buried in the maths of the HDI. It can be granted that a rich person will be able to afford to spend more to live longer than a poor person, and will typically do so. But that does not justify building such inequalities into our assessment of progress in "human development." Given what we know about the marginal costs of extending life expectancy, if one accepted the tradeoffs embodied in the new HDI, one would be drawn to conclude that the most promising way to promote human development in the world would be by investing in higher life expectancy in rich countries-surely an unacceptable implication of the HDI's tradeoffs. And it is unclear why we would want to put so much higher a value on schooling than implied by its economic returns.
Setting the tradeoffs in a composite index is never going to be easy and it is ultimately up to users to judge for themselves if they accept the HDI's valuations. However, the troubling 
